The Law of Legitimacy: An Instrument of Procreative Power by Fellows, Mary Louise
Scholarship Repository 
University of Minnesota Law School 
Articles Faculty Scholarship 
1993 
The Law of Legitimacy: An Instrument of Procreative Power 
Mary Louise Fellows 
University of Minnesota Law School, fello001@umn.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mary Louise Fellows, The Law of Legitimacy: An Instrument of Procreative Power, 3 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 
495 (1993), available at https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles/266. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in the Faculty Scholarship collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu. 
THE LAW OF LEGITIMACY: AN INSTRUMENT
OF PROCREATIVE POWER
Mary Louise Fellows*
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this Article is to explore how inheritance law, through
its reliance on the laws regarding legitimacy, affects the construction of
sexuality and procreative power' in our society. The crucial importance of
female monogamy in a private property regime is well-recognized.2 It is
the only means by which a man can assure himself that his wealth will be
inherited by his offspring. The enforcement of female monogamy by men
enhances a man's procreative power because it provides the basis for his
claim of paternity.3
* University of Minnesota. I especially want to thank Beverly Balos, Adrienne
Davis and Toni McNaron for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
Earlier versions were presented at faculty workshops at Indiana University School of
Law-Bloomington, University of Minnesota Law School and Vanderbilt University
School of Law. I appreciated the opportunity to share these ideas and benefited greatly
by the thoughtful comments of the participants at those workshops. I also want to thank
the University of Oklahoma Law School for allowing me to present an earlier version
of this Article at a public lecture. This Article is a product of thinking I did in
connection with a seminar I taught on Feminist Theory of Donative Transfers. I am
grateful to the students participating in that seminar for their contributions to the ideas
found here.
As used in this Article, the term procreative power refers to the construction of
human reproduction through biology, law and other cultural norms and values.
2 See Frederich Engels, 22 Works of Marxism-Leninism, The Origin of the Family,
Private Property and the State 119-43 (Marxist Libr. ed., 1942); Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State 29-30 (1989).
3 See Adrienne Rich, Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution
119 (10th Ann. ed. 1986). Enforcement of female monogamy, i.e., ensuring that a
woman has only one male partner for life, or at least at any one time, takes many forms
and operates in complex and interlocking ways across abilities, class and race/ethnicity.
Cultural norms that prize female virginity and motherhood, romanticize marriage and
assail women in prostitution are some of the means by which society polices women's
sexuality and men control women's sexuality for the purpose of reinforcing hierarchical
differences based on abilities, class, gender, race/ethnicity and sexual orientation.
Although the cultural norms may be shared across a broad range of the society, that does
not mean that they do not reflect the interests of those persons in dominant positions
within the society. Evidence of the domination is found in the answer to the question:
For whose benefit do the cultural norms operate?
Economic discrimination in the public workplace, along with the sexual harassment
women are forced to endure in that workplace, is another way that female monogamy
is enforced. Workplace discrimination effectively encourages women to marry and to
stay married because marriage appears to be the means by which women are able to
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This Article extends this analysis by considering the particular manner
by which the law implements the legitimacy/illegitimacy dichotomy. It first
investigates the common law presumption that a child born to a married
woman is the child of her husband and the evidentiary rule that prevents
either the husband or the wife from providing testimonial evidence to rebut
the presumption. This Article then examines the Uniform Parentage Act
(UPA), which codifies the presumption and retains vestiges of the
evidentiary rule. These investigations consider the differential impact these
laws have had on both African-American and white women and men.
It is my thesis that the marital presumption, the evidentiary rule, and
the UPA all transfer procreative power to white men while simultaneously
minimizing and denying the procreative power of African-American women
and, in different ways, of white women. Demonstrating how the law of
legitimacy and its traditional justifications may appear benign, but in fact
take on a virulent cast when analyzed in terms of gender and racial
hierarchies, may seem like a modest task. However, its importance lies in
its promise of undermining these hierarchies by exposing the means by
which they are enforced and reinforced.4
Exposing how the law creates and reflects the view of African-
American families as deviant, of African-American women as bad mothers
and of white women as untrustworthy seductresses is a crucial first step in
extricating those stereotypes from our legal and cultural consciousness.
Moreover, understanding that the legal tradition magnifies white fatherhood
while it undermines motherhood for both African-American and white
women will help us articulate and discern the crosscurrents of thoughts
surrounding women's sexuality.
Part II of this Article first describes the eighteenth-century development
of the common law marital presumption and the related evidentiary rule and
obtain some measure of physical and economic security. For further elaboration of
cultural norms and their connection to male control of women and women's sexuality,
see Andrea Dworkin, Women in the Public Domain: Sexual Harassment and Date Rape,
in Sexual Harassment: Women Speak Out 1, 1-5 (Amber Coverdale Sumrall & Dena
Taylor eds., 1992); Paula Giddings, When and Where I Enter: The Impact of Black
Women on Race and Sex in America 47-49 (1985).
4 Linda Gordon urges us to pursue this task when, in a discussion of reproductive
freedom, she says:
We must begin by rejecting the myth of a prehistorical epoch of sexual
freedom. In every known human society sexual activity has been controlled and
limited; since we do not know human life outside of society, we do not know
human life without some degree of sexual repression. In considering the
reproduction issue, we must look at the historical forms of sexual repression.
Linda Gordon, The Struggle for Reproductive Freedom: Three Stages of Feminism, in
Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism 107, 108 (Zillah R. Eisenstein
ed., 1979).
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explores how they both were, and continue to be, justified as serving the
welfare of the child. It then demonstrates how the nineteenth-century courts
allowed the marital presumption to be rebutted in a manner that reinforced
race boundaries and white supremacy. It further demonstrates how other
laws in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries might have operated to keep
the presumption and rule from being used to strengthen the ties between
African-American children and their parents. Finally, it shows how the
marital presumption and the evidentiary rule might have allowed a white
man to avoid his paternal responsibilities when the mother of his child was
a married African-American woman. This discussion reveals that the
consequences of the marital presumption and the evidentiary rule were
greatly affected by slavery and anti-miscegenation laws. Although the
correspondence between slavery and African Americans was not exact,
whites primarily built the institution of slavery by enslaving African
Americans.5 It is also true that prohibitions of marriage between races were
not always limited to marriages between African Americans and whites, but
the primary purpose of these statutes was to assert white supremacy over
African Americans.6 Therefore, the legitimacy/illegitimacy dichotomy has
particular relevance to African Americans and whites and they are the
exclusive focus of my analysis.
Part III of the Article examines how the marital presumption and the
related evidentiary rule operated during the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries with respect to white children in the United States. It shows how
the presumption and rule reinforced the traditional western view that wives
of white men should be under the control of their husbands and how both
contributed to the construction of white women as untrustworthy with
minimal procreative power.
Part IV of the Article examines the UPA, which was promulgated in
1973 and has since been adopted by one-third of the states.7 It first
describes the UPA's codification of the marital presumption and explores
how the UPA's design also has been justified as serving the welfare of the
child. It then explains how the UPA plays upon stereotypical conceptions
of the African-American family and of African-American women and how
that perspective contributes to a statutory scheme regarding the marital
See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Racial Purity and
Interracial Sex in the Law of Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 77 Geo. L.J. 1967,
1970-75 (1989); see also Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 Harv. L. Rev.
1709, 1717 (1993) ("The dominant paradigm of social relations, however, was that,
although not all Africans were slaves, virtually all slaves were not white.").
6 See Paul A. Lombardo, Miscegenation, Eugenics, and Racism: Historical
Footnotes to Loving v. Virginia, 21 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 421, 432 (1988).
' See Unif. Parentage Act, 9B U.L.A. 287 (1973).
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presumption that may fail to meet the needs of African-American children. 8
Finally, it shows how the UPA, most apparently through its statute of
limitations, contains vestiges of the evidentiary rule and thereby continues
the common law tradition of using the law to confer fatherhood upon white
men.
II. THE MARITAL PRESUMPTION, THE LORD MANSFIELD
RULE AND THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN CHILD
A fundamental issue in inheritance law is who is a legal heir of a
married man.9  Suits to determine "heirship" frequently depend on
identification of the decedent's, or an ancestor of the decedent's, legal issue;
the law of legitimacy plays a crucial role in this process.' The issue of
paternity also was, and remains, important for the purpose of imposing child
support obligations." A finding that a child is the legal heir of a married
man means that the man is legally responsible for the child's support during
minority.
The common law established the presumption that a child born to the
wife of a married man was his child unless evidence showed that he had not
had access to his wife throughout the relevant period of gestation or that he
was sterile or impotent. 2 Supporting the marital presumption was Lord
Mansfield's rule of evidence stated in dicta in the 1777 case of Goodright
v. Moss.' 3 Lord Mansfield stated that, although others could testify, the
The legislative history of contemporary law reflected in the UPA, which focused
exclusively on African Americans and whites, see infra note 80 and accompanying text,
provides a supplemental reason for limiting my study of legitimacy to African
Americans and whites.
' See Gordon, supra note 4, at 109 (connecting the emergence of the agricultural
economy, the accumulation of private property and inheritance law to the suppression
of birth control as the means by which men enforced monogamy of women to assure
men that a child of a married woman was the biological child of her husband).
,0 From the sixteenth century in England, the determination of legitimacy not only
affected inheritance rights but also determined access to trade guilds and the like. See
I Ivy Pinchbeck & Margaret Hewitt, Children in English Society: From Tudor Times
to the Eighteenth Century 202 (1969).
" These suits could be brought on behalf of the child or on behalf of the state
seeking to recover welfare payments. Although the proceedings for these suits have
changed dramatically between the eighteenth century and the twentieth century, the
purpose of the suits remains the same - to determine paternity for the purpose of
imposing support obligations.
2 See The King v. Luffe, 103 Eng. Rep. 316 (K.B. 1807).
13 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (K.B. 1777). Goodright was an ejectment action. The basis
of the plaintiff's claim was that the lessor of the plaintiff was the cousin and heir at law
of the woman who had died seized of the premises. The only question before the court
[Vol. 3:2
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declarations by the husband or wife regarding lack of access should not be
admitted. 14 The evidentiary rule stated by Lord Mansfield was widely
adopted in the United States in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 5
The marital presumption and the evidentiary rule currently are
understood to have served the welfare of the child at the expense of a
husband who was married to an adulteress. For example, a leading
hombook on wills and trusts justifies the presumption and the rule by
focusing on the welfare of the child as follows:
If a married woman gave birth to a child, her husband was held
to be the child's father despite any evidence to the contrary.
When a husband went abroad for three years and returned to find
his wife with a month-old daughter, the law deemed the daughter
to be the husband's child because "the privity between a man and
his wife cannot be known." This presumption of paternity by the
mother's husband served to legitimate many children who were
the fruit of adultery, but avoided difficult problems of proof.'6
Concern for the welfare of the child obviously played some role in the
English development of the presumption and the evidentiary rule. As Lord
Mansfield wrote in Goodright:
It is a rule, founded in decency, morality, and policy, that they
shall not be permitted to say after marriage, that they have had
no connection, and therefore that the offspring is surious; more
especially the mother, who is the offending party.'
was whether the lessor of the plaintiff was the legitimate son of a married couple and
qualified as heir of the deceased.
14 Id. at 1258.
'5 See 7 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2063 (James
H. Chadboum rev., 1978); Richard R. Burgee, Comment, The "Lord Mansfield Rule"
and the Presumption of Legitimacy, 16 Md. L. Rev. 336, 337 (1956). Several states
abandoned the Lord Mansfield Rule in the early twentieth century. See, e.g., Evans v.
State, 75 N.E. 651 (Ind. 1905).
The Rule was abrogated in England, by statute, in 1949. Law Reform
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, ch. 100, § 7, repealed by
Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6, ch. 25, § 32.
Today, the UPA and other similar statutes continue to use the presumption and
include other procedures that reflect .vestiges of the Lord Mansfield Rule. See infra
notes 77-79, 82, 106-122 and accompanying text.
16 William M. McGovern, Jr. et al., Wills, Trusts, and Estates Including Taxation
and Future Interests 34-35 (1988) (footnote omitted).
" 98 Eng. Rep. at 1258 (emphasis added).
The "best interests of the child" doctrine was not yet developed at the time Lord
Mansfield wrote his opinion in Goodright. Yet, it is interesting to note Lord
Mansfield's ruling in The King v. Delaval, 97 Eng. Rep. 913 (K.B. 1763), which was
a dispute over the custody of a seduced eighteen-year-old female apprentice. He ruled
1993]
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The remaining portion of part II and part IIIA investigates the
justification of the presumption and the rule as serving the welfare of the
child. Whatever validity there might be to the claim that the presumption
and the rule reflected concern for the welfare of the child, this claim surely
was never intended to have included the welfare of an African-American
child.
A. Maintaining Racial Boundaries
If a child who had African-American features was born to a woman
who was believed to be of the white race and whose husband was also
believed to be of the white race, the nineteenth-century courts refused to
apply the marital presumption. The courts held that the presumption could
be rebutted by "evidence which clearly and conclusively shows that the
procreation by the husband was impossible; and that, .... according to the
course of nature, the husband could not be the father of the child . . .. '
They found repugnant the notion that the presumption inherited from the
common law could be used to legitimate an African-American child and
make her or him the child of a white father. As the court in Watkins v.
Carlton'9 reasoned:
The essence of the rule is, that if it be impossible that the
husband can be the father, the child is a bastard. The cases of
the husband being beyond sea, imprisoned, impotent, and the
that a writ of habeas corpus bound the courts "ex debito justitiae, to set the infant free
from an improper restraint: but they are not bound to deliver them over to any body nor
to give them any privilege. This must be left to their discretion, according to the
circumstances that shall appear before them." Id. at 914. This decision was relied upon
in the early nineteenth century when judges exercised their discretionary power to settle
custody disputes by looking to the child's welfare. See Michael Grossberg, Governing
the Hearth: Law and the Family in Nineteenth-Century America 209-10, 237-43
(1985).
S Bullock v. Knox, 11 So. 339, 340 (Ala. 1891); accord, e.g., Watkins v. Carlton,
37 Va. 560 (1840); see also Wright v. Hicks, 12 Ga. 155 (1852) (dictum); Cross v.
Cross, 3 Paige Ch. 139 (N.Y. Ch. 1832) (dictum).
In particular, several California decisions set forth, in dicta, a "racial difference
exception" to the marital presumption. See In re Walker's Estate, 180 Cal. 478, 491
(1919); In re McNamara's Estate,'181 Cal. 82, 96 (1919); see also John J.O. Bois, Sr.,
Comment, California's Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy - Its Legal Effect and
Its Questionable Constitutionality, 35 S. Cal. L. Rev. 437, 446-48 (1962). This "racial
difference exception" has since been repudiated. See Hess v. Whitsitt, 257 Cal. App.
2d 552, 555 (1967) (holding that the dicta in Walker and McNamara were not sound
law); County of San Diego v. Brown, 80 Cal. App. 3d 297, 302 (1978) (upholding the
statutory presumption of paternity despite an African-American husband's claim that it
was "racially impossible" for him to have fathered his white wife's child).
'9 37 Va. (10 Leigh) 560 (1840).
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like, are but instances of the application of the rule ... How,
then, if the impossibility rests upon the laws of nature itself?
Shall it be less regarded? Shall the white child of a white couple
be bastardized, upon questionable proof that the husband was
rendered impotent by disease; and shall we legitimate a negro
because he was born in wedlock? 2
0
The implications of these holdings go beyond demonstrating that the
welfare of African-American children was not at stake when the marital
presumption and the accompanying evidentiary rule were applied in the
United States. A study of the laws of racial purity and interracial sex in
pre-Civil War Virginia by Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. and Barbara K.
Kopytoff provides critical background for appreciating the racial meanings
of these holdings. 2' First, the holdings must be understood as part of an
effort by the courts and the legislatures to "maintain the purity of the white
race and to preserve it from visible 'darkening."' 22  Application of the
presumption would mean that a child with African-American features would
gain the status of being white. That result would provide corporeal evidence
against the idea of "white racial purity." Thus, allowing the presumption to
be rebutted based on physical appearance served to assist the law in
maintaining racial boundaries.23
Second, these holdings provide evidence that the law had little concern
about preserving the African-American race from "lightening. 24  The
finding in these cases that a child born to a white woman and an African-
American man was illegitimate was implicitly a finding that the child was
African American. The courts' lack of concern about the fact that a child's
mother was white and that this meant that an African American had white
blood indicates that racial purity was uni-directional - racial purity of the
20 Id. at 575 (emphasis added).
21 See Higginbotham & Kopytoff, supra note 5.
22 See id. at 1983.
23 See id. at 1985; see also Marilyn Frye, White Woman Feminist 1983-1992, in
Willful Virgin 147, 149-51 (1992) (describing how race has been socially constructed
on behalf of whites and how it has been constructed as inescapable) Cheryl Harris has
made the following observations:
The possessors of whiteness were granted the legal right to exclude others from
the privileges inhering in whiteness .... The courts played an active role in
enforcing this right to exclude - determining who was or was not white enough
to enjoy the privileges accompanying whiteness ....
... [A]s it emerged, the concept of whiteness was premised on white
supremacy rather than mere difference. "White" was defined and constructed
in ways that increased its value by reinforcing its exclusivity.
Harris, supra note 5, at 1736-37
24 See Higginbotham & Kopytoff, supra note 5, at 1983, 1997.
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white race was the exclusive focus. Only within a context of racial
hierarchy - white supremacy - could concern for "darkening" of the white
race coexist within a system that was indifferent to the implications of white
blood in those persons treated as African Americans.
25
Third, these holdings further the myth of white racial purity by failing
to consider the possibility that both, or either, a white husband or a white
wife might have African-American ancestry. 26  Their interests in
maintaining racial hegemony required courts to attribute adultery to white
women rather than permit any implicit or explicit challenge to a white
supremacist racial classification system. In the antebellum South,
recognition of racial mixing would have undermined the logic of a race-
based system of slavery and the laws supporting it.
27
Fourth, the law's tolerance for judicial error created by the presumption
must be understood as circumscribed by race. The common law adoption
of the marital presumption allowed for the possibility that a child who was
not biologically related to a man would become his heir. The court's desire
to avoid the administrative burdens of unnecessary litigation justified the
potential for error. Thus, judicial error was tolerated when it meant that a
white child, unrelated by blood, would be made a white man's legal heir.
An African-American child becoming a white man's legal heir, however,
was unacceptable. Faced with this situation, the court essentially suspended
application of the presumption.28
Fifth, and finally, these court holdings are consistent with, and should
be seen as complementing, legislative efforts to deter white women from
having sexually intimate relations with African-American men.29 Denying
a white woman the benefit of the presumption and treating her child as
illegitimate based on her or his racial features would parallel the various
statutory enactments promulgated by the states. One reason these harsh laws
were promulgated is that a white woman giving birth to a mixed-race child
was a direct assault on racial purity because, unlike an African-American
25 See id. at 1969; see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (The Court
rejected racial purity justification for antimiscegenation statute finding that "[tihe fact
that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving white persons demonstrates
that the racial classifications must stand on their own justification, as measures designed
to maintain White Supremacy.").
216 See Higginbotham & Kopytoff, supra note 5, at 1998-2000 (exploring the
Watkins case and genealogical possibilities).
27 See id. at 2000.
28 See Watkins, 37 Va. 560.
29 Higginbotham and Kopytoff demonstrate how the Virginia legislature had
particular concern about and meted out severe punishments to white women who married
African-American or mixed-race men or gave birth to mixed-race children outside of
marriage. See Higginbotham & Kopytoff, supra note 5, at 1994-97.
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woman, she had the opportunity to give birth to a white child.30 Thus, a
white woman and an African-American man who chose to have sexual
relations effectively destabilized a regime designed to produce heirs for
white men.
In summary, the unwillingness of nineteenth-century courts to apply the
marital presumption when they believed that it would make an African-
American child an heir of a white man should be understood as one aspect
of a legal and social system designed to preserve white supremacy. The
cases also provide evidence that the question of fatherhood had little to do
with the welfare of the child but a lot to do with white men's claim of white
children as their heirs. Recognizing that the presumption served white males
leaves open the further question of whether the presumption and the related
evidentiary rule could have been used by and on behalf of African-American
families. This question is the subject of the next section.
B. Practical Consequences of the Marital Presumption
and the Lord Mansfield Rule
This section investigates the role that the presumption of legitimacy and
the accompanying evidentiary rule might have played on behalf of African-
American families in the nineteenth century. This type of study, which
explores how the laws affected the lives of free African Americans before
and after the Civil War, is fraught with uncertainty and speculation because
even a rule or doctrine that appeared to be available for use by free African
Americans in a state in fact may not have been applied on their behalf.3
30 See Higginbotham & Kopytoff, supra note 5, at 1997.
3' For example, consider the experience in the probate courts of Boston,
Massachusetts of Mafia W. Stewart, who was the first American-born woman to have
given public speeches. See Giddings, supra note 3, at 49-50. Her husband James W.
Stewart, a ship's outfitter, died in 1829 after having executed his will naming his wife
as beneficiary. See Mafia W. Stewart, America's First Black Woman Political Writer:
Essays and Speeches 7 (Marilyn Richardson ed., 1987). She never received his estate
because various legal maneuvers thwarted his legal right to make a will.
Left a widow after barely three years of marriage, Maria Stewart found
herself... deceived and victimized by a group of white businessmen intent on
profiting from her husband's death. As a result of a series of legal maneuvers
so blatant and shameless that even the presiding judge found them hard to
stomach - at one point a mystery woman was put forth as a competing widow
- Stewart, after more than two years of litigation, ended up effectively stripped
of what should have amounted to a substantial inheritance.
Id. David Walker, an African-American man who was southern-born and the son of a
free black mother and a slave father, published a book earlier that year suggesting that
this was not an uncommon occurrence. Id. at 5. David Walker was a shop owner and
19931
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However, one can draw some tentative conclusions based on statutory and
court-made law.
One conclusion is that the common law presumption and rule were
sometimes rendered inapplicable by other laws of the state. For example,
general limitations on African-Americans' right to testify before
Reconstruction would have made the Lord Mansfield evidentiary rule
irrelevant.3
2
The marital presumption itself had no significance when legal
recognition of marriages entered into by African Americans was denied
depending on the status and race of the woman and man. For example, in
Virginia a marriage between a slave and a free black was not legally
recognized.33 If the mother was a slave, the child of the marriage became
a slave.34 If the mother was free, the child was considered illegitimate and
subject to being hired out by the overseer of the poor." Prohibitions on
interracial marriages also limited the applicability of the presumption and the
evidentiary rule.36 Within this system of laws, there clearly was no place
for the marital presumption's concepts of fatherhood, motherhood, or the
welfare of the child to operate.
In some states, during some or all of the nineteenth century, legal
marriages between African-American women and men were possible. In
those states the presumption and evidentiary rule might operate. The social
system infected and affected by the slavery regime, however, might have
prevented the presumption and rule from playing a meaningful role for
writer in Boston. In his book, he wrote, "when a man of color dies, if he owned any
real estate it most generally falls into the hands of some white person. The wife and
children of the deceased may weep and lament if they please, but the estate will be kept
snug enough by its white possessor." Walker's Appeal, In Four Articles: Together With
A Preamble, To The Coloured Citizens of the World, But In Particular, And Very
Expressly, To Those Of The United States Of America 12 (1829). These bits of
evidence suggest that legal tactics could easily turn the nineteenth-century rights of
African Americans into empty promises.
32 See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Anne F. Jacobs, The "Law Only as an
Enemy": The Legitimization of Racial Powerlessness Through the Colonial and
Antebellum Criminal Laws of Virginia, 70 N.C. L. Rev. 969, 994-96 (1992) (detailing
the succession of laws in Virginia that at first prohibited all African Americans, slave
or free, from giving evidence under oath, then permitted some testimony, but only
against slaves accused of capital offenses, and finally permitted free Christian African
Americans to testify against or between other African Americans, slave or free; it was
not until 1867 that African Americans had the unrestricted right to testify in Virginia).
33 See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Greer C. Bosworth, "Rather than the Free":
Free Blacks in Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 26 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 17, 53
(1991).
34 Id. at 54.
35 Id.
36 See Higginbotham & Kopytoff, supra note 5, at 2006, 2021-25.
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African-American women and men. Without the panoply of legal, economic
or social privileges enjoyed by white men, many African-American men
were unable to exercise control over their families in a traditional patriarchal
manner. Since the marital presumption is both produced by and reflective
of white patriarchal power, it is unlikely that it would have had a significant
effect on African-American families. Consider the following narrative from
an African American from Georgia who describes his life during the last
decade of the nineteenth century:
I lived in that camp, as a peon, for nearly three years. My
wife fared better than I did, as did the wives of some of the other
negroes, because the white men about the camp used these
unfortunate creatures as their mistresses. When I was first put
into the stockade my wife was still kept for a while in the "Big
House," but my little boy, who was only nine years old, was
given away to a negro family across the river .... When I left
the camp my wife had had two children by some of the white
bosses, and she was living in fairly good shape in a little house
off to herself.
But I didn't tell you how I got out. I didn't get out - they
put me out .... [W]hen I had served for nearly three years, one
of the bosses came to me and said that my time was up. He
happened to be the one who was said to be living with my
wife.37
This narrative reveals how utterly irrelevant the marital presumption could
be in creating and maintaining this African-American family. Instead, the
presumption served as a shield for the "white bosses" against any claim of
support by the children born to the narrator's wife. The issue for the
African-American couple was not whether the wife's two children would be
part of their household. Rather, the narrator and his wife were denied each
other's company and support altogether and were left not knowing whether
they would ever see their own child again. The marital presumption,
"' The Life Story of a Negro Peon, in Black Women in White America: A
Documentary History 151, 153-55 (Gerda Lerner ed., 1973) (originally published as The
Life Story of a Negro Peon, Obtained from an Interview with a Georgia Negro, in
Hamilton Holt, The Life Stories of Undistinguished Americans, As Told by Themselves
(1906); based on an interview originally published in the Independent (1901)). The
husband's assumption that his wife was "living in fairly good shape" reflected the
traditional stereotype of African-American women "choosing" multiple sexual partners
and benefiting economically from those choices. The stereotype not only prevented the
husband from understanding the sexual violence that his wife likely endured, but it also
allowed the white bosses to perpetrate that violence with impunity. See Melton A.
McLaurin, Celia, A Slave (1991) (tells the story of a young girl whose white master
enslaved and sexually exploited her for five years; she was convicted and executed for
her white master's murder when he refused to stop coming to her cabin to rape her).
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premised on a husband having control over his wife's sexuality,3 has little
relevance where the social and economic deprivation exacted by white men
made control of another person unimaginable and personal survival all
consuming. 9
This narrative suggests the problematic nature of the legal concepts of
fatherhood, motherhood, and welfare of the child when applied to African
Americans who did not and were not allowed to participate in the patriarchal
European tradition. It is important not to leave the impression, however,
that the white bosses destroyed the family. This narrative contains a story
of resistance. In the end, the narrator's wife uses what power she had to
live "in fairly good shape in a little house off to herself' and to free her
husband from peonage.' A different set of rules and presumptions
operated for this family - ones that Lord Mansfield could not even begin
to imagine.
It is thus unlikely that the presumption and the related evidentiary rule
could have been used by and on behalf of African-American families. Other
laws made the marital presumption and the evidentiary rule irrelevant in
many instances before the Civil War. Although some of Lhose laws were
inapplicable to free African Americans before the Civil War or were
rescinded after the Civil War brought an end to the legal regime of slavery,
the marital presumption probably played no significant role. The marital
presumption is part of a white patriarchal family tradition that gains its
power through economic, social and legal institutions. The benefits of
these institutions were not available to African-American men and, without
38 Whether ownership and control over a wife were part of African traditions is
debatable, bell hooks makes the following argument:
An examination of many traditional African societies' attitudes toward women
reveals that African men were not taught to see themselves as the protectors of
all women. They were taught to assume responsibility for the particular women
of their tribe or community. The socialization of African men to see themselves
as the "owners" of all black women and to regard them as property they should
protect occurred after the long years of slavery and as the result of bonding on
the basis of color rather than shared tribal connection or language.
bell hooks, Ain't I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism 34-35 (1981).
" See id. at 35 (instincts of the African-American men were toward self-
preservation in the face of the brutal assaults against African-American women).
40 Angela Davis argues that the conditions of slavery engendered resistance by
African-American women:
This was one of the greatest ironies of the slave system, for in subjecting
women to the most ruthless exploitation conceivable, exploitation which knew
no sex distinctions, the groundwork was created not only for Black women to
assert their equality through their social relations, but also to express it through
their acts of resistance.
Angela Davis, Women, Race & Class 23 (1981).
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them, the marital presumption had little positive effect on the lives of the
men or their families.
The analysis of the marital presumption and the Lord Mansfield rule
with regard to the African-American child permits us to see how the marital
presumption operated in the nineteenth century to reinforce white supremacy
and patriarchal power. Part III will provide further evidence of the
patriarchal significance of the presumption and the rule when it considers
the operation of both during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
with regard to the white child.
Ill. THE MARITAL PRESUMPTION, THE LORD
MANSFIELD RULE AND THE WHITE CHILD
A. Welfare of the Child
Part II raised serious questions about the claim that the marital
presumption and Lord Mansfield's evidentiary rule served the welfare of the
African-American child. I will now explore whether the claim regarding the
welfare of the child has any validity for a white child born to white parents
during the nineteenth or early twentieth centuries.
If preventing the white child from becoming legally illegitimate was the
court's central concern, then why would the court allow anyone to testify
that the husband had not had access to his wife? Based on this testimony,
a white child would be stigmatized and lose potentially significant economic
rights, including the right of support against the mother's husband, the right
to inherit from him and the right of admission to trade guilds and the
like.4' Admission of any testimony of nonaccess demonstrates that the
welfare of the child was subordinate to the law's interest in protecting the
husband from obligations to support a white child that was not his by blood
and in protecting the husband and the husband's family from having any of
their property pass by succession to a white child who was not genetically
related.42
"' See I Pinchbeck & Hewitt, supra note 10, at 202.
42 The courts sometimes expressed disdain for the idea of allowing a man's property
to pass to a child who was not genetically his:
The law says it is presumptively his child; still he may show by whatever proof
he may command, that he has been made the innocent victim of fraud and
artifice.... It is repugnant to the feelings of every man, that his property, upon
his demise, should descend through channels where his blood did not flow;
channels too, tainted and corrupted by the grossest impurity.
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The law's failure to consider alternatives to the legitimate/illegitimate
dichotomy, such as dual paternity, demonstrates the inadequacy of the child-
welfare justification. I could find no evidence that dual paternity was even
imagined by the common law courts, which itself suggests that they were
not focused on the child's needs and concerns. The law could have
prevented illegitimatization of the child by treating the mother's husband as
the legitimate father while at the same time permitting proof of paternity by
another man. Dual paternity remains an unfamiliar and virtually undebated
idea today, except in Louisiana.43
Perhaps, the absence of any consideration of dual paternity is
attributable to some notion that the best interests of a child are served when
only one man answers to the name father. There are two other equally
plausible explanations, however, for the dismissal of the idea of dual
paternity. One is that dual paternity destroys the husband's power, accorded
to him through the marital presumption, to prevent the biological father from
interfering in the husband's relationship with his white legitimate child.
Moreover, it would represent a public and legal acknowledgment that a
husband had "lost" control of his wife to another man. In that sense, the
concept of dual paternity is wholly inconsistent with the marital
presumption, which is based on the premise that husbands have the power
to control their wives.
At the same time dual paternity thwarts a biological father who wants
to use the marital presumption as a shield to avoid paternal responsibilities.
Wright v. Hicks, 12 Ga. 155 (1852) (heirship case in which grandson claimed an interest
in the estate of his grandfather).
43 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118 (1989) (Scalia, J.) ("California
law, like nature itself, makes no provision for dual fatherhood."). But see Smith v.
Cole, 553 So. 2d 847 (La. 1989) (holding that a statute that treated a child as the
legitimate child of the mother's husband did not preclude a finding that the child's
biological father had an obligation to provide support for his child); Smith v. Jones, 566
So. 2d 408 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (the putative father was permitted to establish paternity
where he had been prevented from forming an actual relationship by the mother and he
instituted action within a reasonable time of the child's birth; the legitimate father's
status was unaffected by this action); Pamela S. Nagy, Case Comment, Smith v. Cole:
Triumph in Family Court, 40 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1157 (1990); Jerry Speir, Casenote,
Smith v. Cole: Biological Fathers Owe Support to Their Children Despite the Mother's
Marriage to Another and the Civil Code's "Strongest Presumption," 36 Loy. L. Rev. 225
(1990). Dual paternity raises other issues, such as: Are both fathers responsible for
support?; Will a child with two fathers be required to support both?; Once the
biological father is required to tender support for his child, does that support then imply
other substantive rights, such as visitation rights, custody rights, rights to participate in
decisions about the child's education and the like? The Smith court suggests that, when
confronted with these issues, it will base its decision on equity, the capacity of the
biological father to provide support and the best interest of the child. See Smith, 553
So. 2d at 855 n.8. It also suggests that the biological father should obtain substantive
rights. See id. at 854.
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Thus, dual paternity would have increased the risk of forced fatherhood
outside of marriage. It also would have increased the possibility that a
white man would be thrust into fatherhood of an African-American child.
Both of these explanations have little to do with children's welfare. Both
have a good deal to do with the law helping the men who benefit from
patriarchy and white supremacy achieve comfortable circumstances for
themselves.
The court's willingness to base a finding of illegitimacy on the
testimony of persons other than the married couple and the total absence of
consideration of the concept of dual paternity make suspect the claim that
the marital presumption and the Lord Mansfield rule are designed to further
the welfare of the white child. Showing that the proffered welfare-of-the-
child explanation fails is not proof that welfare of white men is the
explanation. That explanation is reasonable only once other possible neutral
rationales are explored and found unconvincing. In search of other
persuasive reasons for the presumption and the evidentiary rule, the next
section investigates whether they can be defended on efficiency grounds.
B. Efficiency
Although the courts in the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries did not explicitly raise issues regarding efficiency when developing
or applying the marital presumption and the Lord Mansfield evidentiary rule,
it seems to hold some explanatory promise. Whenever title to property
depended upon succession, the presumption of legitimacy avoided the
administrative burdens of providing positive proof of genetic kinship
between the white husband and his wife's white child." Common law
judges likely would have concluded that the cost of error caused by the
presumption was outweighed by the burdens of litigating this issue.
Moreover, it avoided the cost of erroneously finding that the wife's child
was not the husband's in the circumstances when the proponent for
legitimacy might be unable to meet her or his burden of proof in the
absence of a marital presumption. On the other hand, the admission of
testimony by persons other than the husband and wife, including the
testimony of the putative father, is consistent with an efficiency explanation.
By admitting testimony by others regarding nonaccess by the husband, the
courts reduced the cost of error caused by the presumption.
The refusal to admit the testimony of the white husband and wife
regarding nonaccess, however, would seem inconsistent with reducing the
4 By positive proof I mean testimonial or circumstantial evidence relating to the
possibility and probability of sexual relations between the husband and the wife.
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cost of error produced by the presumption and cannot be otherwise justified
by general rules of the day regarding disqualification of testimony by
interested parties or of spouses testifying for or against the other. Professor
Wigmore, in his treatise entitled Evidence in Trials at Common Law, shows
how this rule was not supported by the legal precedent of the time. Before
Goodright, the only objection made was that of the disqualification of wife
or husband to testify for or against the other and this objection was usually
held not applicable on the facts of the case.45
What then can explain the common law's sometime concern for the
child's welfare, sometime preference for a child created by blood, and
sometime preference for a child created by marriage, and the common law's
abhorrence of the couple's testimony, especially the wife's, regarding
nonaccess of the husband? The answer, set forth in the next section, is
found by focusing on the relationship of white men to their property and
procreative power.
'5 See 7 Wigmore, supra note 15, § 2063, at 469. Professor Wigmore identifies a
rule unique to filiation cases that arose about the middle of the 1700s. The courts held
that, in proceedings charging a putative father with the support of a child, "the order of
support should not be made against the defendant on the sole and uncorroborated
testimony of the mother, if a married woman .... " Id. Wigmore explains this rule in
the following way:
In the first place, it was limited strictly to filiation proceedings; it had no status
as a rule of general application, for its reason had no such bearings. In the next
place, the ground of the objection was that of interest, i.e., the wife was
testifying to discharge the husband of the child's support; yet the objection did
not in strictness apply (since the husband was not a party), and furthermore the
exception of necessity . . . would in any event allow her testimony to
intercourse with the other man. Her testimony to nonaccess, however, being
only technically admissible within the rule of disqualification by interest, some
additional corroboration was thought essential in order to found an order ....
The important feature of this rule is thus the bearing of the wife's
disqualification by interest; and, when the question first comes up in the United
States, the same objection is the one that occupies judicial attention - a
principle which, of course, today in most of our jurisdictions is outlawed (partly
or entirely) by statute .... That the testimony is to the fact of nonaccess is
therefore of no importance at all in this rule .... except so far as the necessity
exception to the rule of disqualification by interest might not apply to that fact
while it might apply to others. That the fact of nonaccess, of itself, was a thing
not properly to be testified to, either on moral or on sentimental grounds, or that
parents could not testify to illegitimacy, never for a moment occurred to thesejudicial expounders of the common law; and this is seen clearly enough in
rulings throughout the 1700s, in other kinds of litigation, where the objection
based on disqualification by interest did not arise as it did for the case of
filiation proceedings.
Id. § 2063 at 470-71 (footnotes omitted).
Professor Wigmore's primary objection to the Lord Mansfield rule "is that he had
no authority whatever for his utterance." Id. § 2063 at 471.
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C. White Male Procreative Power
As Adrienne Rich, in her book Of Woman Born: Motherhood as
Experience and Institution, writes:
At the core of patriarchy is the individual family unit which
originated with the idea of property and the desire to see one's
property transmitted to one's biological descendants. . . .A
crucial moment in human consciousness ... arrives when man
discovers that it is he himself. . . who impregnates the woman;
that the child she carries and gives birth to is his child, who can
make him immortal ....
The problem for this white man, however, is how to know with certainty
that his wife's child is his child.
If he is to know "his" children, he must have control over their
reproduction, which means he must possess their mother
exclusively. The question of "legitimacy" probably goes deeper
than even the desire to hand on one's possession to one's own
blood-line; it cuts back to the male need to say: "I, too, have the
power of procreation - these are my seed, my own begotten
children, my proof of elemental power.""
In the instances where the presumption made a difference, something
critically wrong had occurred: a white husband had lost exclusive sexual
possession of his wife and thereby lost procreative power. Seeing the
problem in this way allows us to recognize the possibility that the common
law, as developed in the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
might have been used to ameliorate this painful fact. Wrapped in the
rhetoric of the welfare of the child, the common law can be understood to
have moved to preserve the remnants of the husband's procreative power by
presuming he had sexual intercourse with his wife and that it was his seed
that begot the child. This perspective also provides some insight into
how the presumption and the Lord Mansfield rule might have operated.
Within the context of a European culture that gave men nearly
exclusive control over their household, the presumption left the husband
with the power to decide how to constitute his family. If he personally
believed the child was his or if he decided that he wanted this child to be
46 Rich, supra note 3, at 60.
41 Id. at 119.
4' Moreover it provided him some compensation for treating the child as his. For
example, the birth of issue to the marriage assured him his tenure of curtesy in his
wife's property. See, e.g., Hunter v. Whitworth, 9 Ala. 965 (1846).
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his, he was free to play the role of father.49 If he believed the child was
another man's, he could meet his support obligations at minimal financial
costs and disinherit the child by writing a will.
Consider, for example, the acts of the husband in the 1857
Pennsylvania case of Dennison v. Page,50 which was a case contesting the
legitimacy of an heir to the husband's estate. The husband married and,
three or four months afterwards, his wife gave birth to a daughter. The facts
recited in the case indicate that the husband "instantly disclaimed being the
father of the child, and she was almost immediately removed to her
grandfather's, by whom she was raised . . . .,,5' The husband apparently
failed to write a will to assure that his "legal" daughter did not inherit his
property,52 but he certainly had the power to do so.
The evidentiary rule that allows the presumption to be rebutted by
testimony of nonaccess by persons other than the husband and wife can also
be understood as serving the harmed husband. If he decided to pursue a
public remedy, the husband had the right to present testimony by others
regarding nonaccess for the purpose of rebutting the presumption and
avoiding fatherhood.53
For example, in the 1832 New York case of Cross v. Cross,54 the
husband sued his wife for a divorce upon the ground of adultery. The court
held that adultery had been proved sufficiently and focused only on the
question of the legitimacy of the child bom to the wife. It held that the
testimony of the husband's mother, who lived with her son during the
relevant time of gestation, was sufficient to prove nonaccess.
The evidentiar rule serves the harmed husband. Giving the wife the
right to speak about her husband's nonaccess would have required the
common law to acknowledge her power to know her child with certainty
and also to know who could or could not be the child's father. It would lay
bare the truth that could otherwise remain obscure: women have a unique
and elemental power to procreate. To give her the power to testify to
nonaccess would mean that her husband would lose his power, provided to
49 There was some risk that the biological father could claim the child if he could
prove nonaccess of the husband by the testimony of persons other than the husband and
wife.
5o 29 Pa. 420 (1857).
s' Id. at 421.
52 It was alleged in the case that the deceased husband had stated that his wife's
daughter should not inherit any of his estate. Id. at 424.
53 The wife also could present testimony by others of nonaccess. See infra note 72
for a discussion of how this might be useful to her.
"4 3 Paige Ch. 139 (N.Y. Ch. 1832).
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him through the marital presumption, to choose fatherhood and to control
the harm caused by having lost exclusive sexual possession of his wife.
Beyond an unwillingness to acknowledge the wife's procreative power,
another reason for silencing the wife could have been that allowing her to
testify to nonaccess would give her the power to speak falsehoods about her
sexual relations with her husband. Justice Melvin's dissent in In re
McNamara's Estate55 provides evidence that the uncorrobative nature of
the wife's testimony was a substantial factor supporting the Lord
Mansfield's rule. In this case, the majority made inroads into the Rule by
holding admissible the wife's testimony regarding nonaccess by the husband.
It admitted her testimony because it pertained to the time period when she
had separated from her husband and not to the time when they cohabited.
Justice Melvin dissented from this holding:
To allow cohabiting married people thus to impeach the
legitimacy of children born in wedlock would be, as well stated
in the opinion in Estate of Mills, "to allow evidence which
shocks every sense of decency and propriety." Yet in the case at
bar evidence quite as shocking was permitted, namely, the
statement of . . . [the wife] regarding her alleged menstrual
periods. This is the sort of testimony which may be
manufactured with out [sic] fear of contradiction. Its admission
puts a premium upon perjury.56
Woman as untrustworthy speaker is a theme that continually winds its way
through eighteenth- and nineteenth-century law and has continuing vitality
even today. Lord Mansfield's rule reinforces that theme.
If weaccept that the silencing of the eighteenth-, nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century wife regarding her sexual relations with her husband
served her husband, how do we explain the concomitant silencing of the
husband regarding his sexual relations with his wife? Why is he not given
the power to say he did not have sexual intercourse with his wife during the
period of conception?
" 183 P. 552 (Cal. 1919).
56 Id. at 560-61 (Melvin, J., dissenting).
The "manufactured" testimony concern expressed by Justice Melvin presumably
would extend to testimony of a woman regarding when she used birth control. Some
have attempted to introduce such evidence in paternity actions. See, e.g., B.P. v. G.P.,
536 A.2d 271 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1987) (following a judgment for divorce resolving child
custody and support issues, the former wife filed a complaint alleging that a man other
than her divorced husband was the child's father; the complaint detailed her use of birth
control; the probative value of that evidence was not tested because the court held the
divorced wife was precluded from filing the complaint following the judgment for
divorce).
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The Virginia Supreme Court reasoned in the 1811 case of Bowles v.
Bingham" that the husband is not allowed to testify because:
Our law wisely throws a veil over acts of incontinency ... and,
certainly, will not, without necessity, and in a spirit of departure
from the wise rule of public economy .... inundate our Courts
with indecent inquiries, whether this or that man, whether the
husband or another, committed a given act of immorality and
fornication. It will, at least, emphatically, interdict the
HUSBAND from giving evidence in such case, for the reasons so
luminously assigned, in ... Goodright .... It is even better that
a particular grievance should exist, than a scene of this sort be
opened, without necessity, in a country in which public decorum
is a part of its law, to contaminate and destroy the morals and
peace of our country.58
Of course, preventing the husband from speaking regarding the issue of
access did not keep decorum in the courtroom. Consider, for example,
Cross v. Cross,59 the 1832 New York case discussed earlier, which
determined paternity after a suit for divorce against the wife based on
adultery. Although the court refused to hear the testimony of either the
husband or the wife regarding nonaccess, it nevertheless lifted the "veil" and
pursued "indecent inquiries:"
The wife had become perfectly abandoned and worthless ....
[Flor 18 months before the birth of the child, the [wife] had lived
in another town, and had not even been to the [husband's] house
to visit her children during that time .... It also satisfactorily
appears that the [wife] had sexual intercourse with several
persons after her separation from her husband, and with two of
them about nine months previous to the birth of the child; and
with the one who is supposed to be the father, repeatedly.'
Perhaps one reason why the common law denied the husband the power
to speak was for the purpose of convincing wives that the law accords them
the same treatment as it accords their husbands.6' It would have been
5' 16 Va. (2 Munf.) 442, 17 Va. (3 Munf.) 599 (1811).
58 17 Va. at 602-03. This case was brought by the administrator under a bill of
interpleader against the father and maternal relations of the deceased, Harriet Bowles,
a deceased infant. The court held that the father was her heir at law based on the
presumption that he was her legal father.
" 3 Paige Ch. 139 (N.Y. Ch. 1832).
60 Id. at 141.
61 Some limited evidence supporting the speculation that judges would be concerned
about the appearance of equality of treatment between white husbands and wives comes
from a series of lectures and articles written in 1839 and 1840 by Simon Greenleaf, a
professor of law at Harvard University. See Dianne Avery & Alfred S. Konefsky, The
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difficult for Lord Mansfield to justify the rule in terms of the child's welfare
unless the husband's freedom to speak was limited along with the wife's.
If the rule is to be based on a concern for the illegitimatization of a child,
the testimony of a husband to prove nonaccess would be as offensive as the
testimony of a wife. It is well to note, however, that Lord Mansfield
suggested that the testimony of the wife was more offensive when he
especially singled her out as "the offending party."62  Surely Lord
Mansfield could have convinced himself and other judges applying his dicta
that white children would have been sufficiently protected by refusing to
admit the testimony of the wife, the offending party, and that there was no
need to refuse to admit the husband's testimony. My argument, however,
is that by extending the evidentiary rule to husbands, Lord Mansfield
allowed for the appearance of equal treatment of wives and husbands under
the law.63 Moreover, to provide for equal treatment in this particular
instance was relatively costless, because the white husband as family head
had a range of legal and extralegal remedies to deal with the possibility that
another man's child was in his household.'
Daughters of Job: Property Rights and Women's Lives in Mid-Nineteenth-Century
Massachusetts, 10 Law & Hist. Rev. 323 (1992). He argued that women were treated
equally with men under the law and with regard to married women specifically he
described marriage as "a partnership, on terms of equality; - a community of interests,
- a union of wills and minds; - a surrender.., a mutual pledge." Simon Greenleaf,
5 Christian Rev. 269, 278 (1840).
62 98 Eng. Rep. 1257, 1258 (K.B. 1777).
63 Cf. Douglas Hay, Property Authority and the Criminal Law, in Albion's Fatal
Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England 17 (Douglas Hay et al. eds.,
1975), in which the author demonstrates how in eighteenth-century England the ruling
class organized its power in the state effectively atid with legitimacy through the
criminal law. He writes: "In considering the criminal law as an ideological system, we
must look at how it combined imagery and force, ideals and practice, and try to see how
it manifested itself to the mass of unpropertied Englishmen." Id. at 26. This argument
has relevance to the paternity context, because it allows us to see that the marital
presumption and evidentiary rule were a part of an "ideological system" that "combined
imagery and force, ideals and practice" in a manner that allowed white, married,
propertied men to manipulate it to their advantage.
4 A similar argument had been made to rebut the claim that married women and
men exchanged different but equivalent burdens and benefits in the nineteenth century.
One of the burdens of marriage undertaken by men that was frequently mentioned was
that upon marriage he became responsible for paying all of his wife's debts. See Avery
& Konefsky, supra note 57, at 336. The argument is that the responsibility of a wife's
debt was a burden that made up for the benefit that a husband gained by having access
to her wealth. The debt burden, however, apparently was illusory. Historical evidence
suggests that women avoided debt and did not frequently marry with debt. See id. at
343; Susan Lebsock, The Free Women of Petersburg: Status and Culture in a Southern
Town, 1784-1860, at 126, 127 (1984). Thus, once the legal rules are contextualized and
historicized, we can see that what might otherwise appear to be equivalent treatment
between husbands and wives in fact is not.
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The rule also could have served the purpose of convincing white men,
who controlled lawmaking, that the law was just and not merely a
manifestation of their brute force.65 By attributing the silencing of the wife
to the child's welfare, Lord Mansfield provided evidence of the common
law's interest in relieving hardship and doing positive good for those
persons who have no means of protecting themselves. The fact that neither
Lord Mansfield nor any other lawmakers reconsidered the law's general
harshness toward illegitimate children demonstrates how limited their
concern was. Nevertheless, once they had convinced (deceived) themselves
that the rule was not made in their own self-interest of preserving the laws
regarding fatherhood for the benefit of fathers, then logic led them
ineluctably to extend the silencing rule to fathers.
The final purpose that might have been served by the eighteenth-
century rule of refusing to hear the testimony of both husbands and wives
is that of allowing men to deny that they feared and envied women's
procreative power and knowledge. By silencing themselves along with their
wives, husbands were able to avoid admitting that they did not have equal
or greater access to procreation.'
Feminist scholars have spent a good deal of time documenting how
man has laid claim to the procreative process. For example, Simone de
Beauvoir writes:
With the advent of patriarchal institutions, the male laid eager
claim to his posterity. It was still necessary to grant the mother
a part in procreation, but it was conceded only that she carried
and nourished the living seed, created by the father alone.
Aristotle fancied that the fetus arose from the union of sperm and
menstrual blood, woman furnishing only passive matter while the
male principle contributed force, activity, movement, life.
Hippocrates held to a similar doctrine, recognizing two kinds of
seed, the weak or female and the strong or male. The theory of
Aristotle survived through the Middle Ages and into modern
times.
At the end of the seventeenth century . . . . "spermatic
animalcules" were discovered and it was proved that they
penetrated into the uterus of the female; but it was supposed that
they were simply nourished therein and that the coming
' See generally E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act
219-69 (1975) (arguing that "[t]he oligarchs and the great gentry were content to be
subject to the rule of law only because this law was serviceable and afforded to their
hegemony the rhetoric of legitimacy" Id. at 269).
6 Cf. Sherry F. Colb, Words that Deny, Devalue, and Punish: Judicial Responses
to Fetus-Envy?, 72 B.U. L. Rev. 101, 111, 114 (1992) (making parallel arguments with
regard to the holding in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), discussed supra
note 43 and infra note 122).
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individual was preformed in them .... Under these imaginative
hypotheses, woman was restricted to the nourishment of an
active, living principle already preformed in perfection. These
notions were not universally accepted, and they were argued into
the nineteenth century. [Even after] the use of the microscope.
. [led to the egg being] recognized as an active principle, men
still tried to make a point of its quiescence as contrasted with the
lively movements of the sperm. 
7
Allowing a wife to speak to access would be wholly inconsistent with white
men's struggle to control the procreative process. Silencing only the wife
regarding access would also operate as an admission that she possessed
special knowledge regarding her own maternity and her husband's paternity.
Faced with the conundrum that to admit her testimony would be an
admission of her procreative power and that to single her out as the only
one not able to testify would also be an admission of her greater
uncorrobated knowledge, the rule silencing both wife and husband permitted
the greatest possibility of maintaining the male claim to equal or greater
contribution to the procreative process.68
The judicial opinions themselves provide support for the proposition
that the marital presumption and the related evidentiary rules represent the
law's struggle to wrest procreative power from a woman. Consider the
court's language in In re McNamara's Estate,69 regarding the presumption:
[T]he process of conception is a hidden one, and the organs
perform their appropriate functions without the volition of the
female and without her being conscious that the process is going
on. Where she has had intercourse with more than one man at
about the same time, and a child has resulted, neither she nor any
one else can say with reasonable certainty which is the father. ' "
By minimizing her role in reproduction and by denying any possibility she
could say with certainty who the father of her child is, the courts denigrated
the women's procreative power and thereby created the possibility for men
to control fatherhood. The silencing along with the marital presumption
67 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex 8-9 (H. M. Parshley trans. & ed., 1989).
' Professor Reva Siegel makes a parallel argument regarding abortion-restrictive
regulation: "If one analyzes the incidence and structure of fetal-protective regulation, it
is possible to see that such regulation reflects social judgments about women's roles, and
not simply solicitude for the welfare of the unborn." Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the
Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal
Protection, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 261, 266 (1992).
69 183 P. 552 (Cal. 1919) (determining heir for intestacy purposes).
70 Id. at 557.
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itself, in effect, accomplished for the husband what science was denying
him: procreative power.7'
Parts IIIA and IIIB examined the question whether the marital
presumption and the Lord Mansfield Rule could be justified either on the
basis of the welfare of the white child or on the basis of efficiency. They
concluded that neither rationale for the presumption and the evidentiary rule
was persuasive. Part ILIC then showed how the presumption and rule could
be satisfactorily explained in terms of procreative power. The legal
doctrines gave white husbands the means to constitute their families. At the
same time (and relatedly) the legal doctrines served to undermine female
procreative power. They did this first by allowing persons other than the
wife and the husband to testify regarding her adulterous acts. Thus these
doctrines were one of the means by which white women's sexuality was
policed and monogamy was enforced. Second, they undermined female
procreative power by silencing women. By not allowing her to testify with
regard to information about which she had unique knowledge, such as her
menstrual periods, the law denied recognition of that unique knowledge.
The fact that it could not be corroborated was a reason to silence her rather
than a reason to require her critical testimony. Finally, the doctrines
undermined female procreative power by silencing the husband, which
"' It is interesting to note that Elaine Showalter has identified a similar
reproductive-envy theme in literature at the same time that the presumption and related
evidentiary rules were being applied. Describing the response of male fiction writers
to George Eliot's literary legacy, she writes:
[Tihere may have been psychological reasons why men, especially young men,
needed to express superiority to Eliot and contempt for her work .... One
defense against the mother's reign is to appropriate her power by repressing the
maternal role in procreation and creation, and replacing it with a fantasy of self-
fathering. Indeed, the replacement of heterosexual procreation and maternity by
"the asexual reproduction of fathers on their own" is part of the European
literary tradition from Genesis and Paradise Lost to Hawthorne's "The
Birthmark" and James Watson's The Double Helix.
While fantasies of male self-creation and envy of the feminine aspects of
generation were not new, they reemerged with a peculiar virulence in the 1880s.
.. In the male writing of the fin de sicle, celibate male creative generation
was valorized, and female powers of creation and reproduction were denigrated.
Gerald Manley Hopkins, for example, wrote in 1886 that "the begetting of one's
thoughts on paper" is "a kind of male gift," clearly a gift of begetting that
requires no female assistance and avoids contact with the maternal body. In
numerous texts, male reproduction or self-replication: splitting or cloning, as
in Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde; reincarnation, as in Rider Haggard's She;
transfusion, as in Dracula; aesthetic duplication, as in The Picture of Dorian
Gray; or vivisection, as in The Island of Dr. Moreau. These enterprises are
celibate, yet procreative metaphors for male self-begetting. They reject natural
paternity for fantastic versions of fatherhood.
Elaine Showalter, Sexual Anarchy: Gender and Culture at the Fin de Si~cle 77-78
(1990).
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allowed the husband to avoid admitting the wife's special knowledge. Thus
the husband was left with the legal and extralegal remedies to choose
fatherhood - to claim paternity when that served his interest and to limit
the consequences of, or avoid altogether, paternity when that suited his
wishes. Within a society in which cultural, religious, and economic
institutions supported the white patriarchal family, the silencing of the
husband along with the wife served to accomplish the husband's ultimate
goal: the acquisition of exclusive procreative power.
D. Potential Benefits to White Women
One further question to be explored is whether the marital presumption
and the accompanying evidentiary rules served some women's interests
during the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries. For
working class women who were separated, but not divorced, from their
husbands and for whom the modem-day equivalent of a paternity suit
against the child's putative father was necessary, the evidentiary rules might
prove particularly troubling.72 Unless others could testify to the husband's
nonaccess, the putative father could use the marital presumption to defend
against a charge of paternity.
Although she was thus constrained from establishing someone other
than her husband as the father, the presumption and the limitations on proof
certainly did not assure a woman, regardless of her class, that her child
would be treated, in fact, as the legal child of her husband. Within the
family unit, her economic and social dependence on her husband might have
made it difficult for her to force him to treat her child as his. Consider the
Pennsylvania case of Dennison v. Page,73 in which the husband apparently
forced the wife to give up her child.74 This case illustrates that the
72 See, e.g., Hall v. State, 5 A.2d 916 (Md. 1939); People v. Overseers of the Poor
of Ontario, 15 Barb. 296 (N.Y. 1853).
In a study of the working class in England in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, E.P. Thompson observes that it was easier for a husband to desert his wife
and children than for her to desert them. 'The man might be able to take with him
some trade; once hidden in the city from the pursuit of the overseers of the poor he
might set up with a new 'common law' partner." E.P. Thompson, Customs in Common
444 (1991). The practical effect of the presumption in improving the lives of wives and
children is thus placed into question. But see id. at 452, 454 (documenting application
of the presumption in a family situation where the wife and the husband had separated
and established new households; the parties found themselves in court when a dispute
arose between the two parishes about the maintenance of the children; cases like this
arose because although the law provided for divorce, it was not easily available to the
working class).
7' 29 Pa. 420 (1857).
74 See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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presumption provided neither mothers nor their children with economic or
physical security.
Thus, it is difficult to see how any white woman within the patriarchal
family system, whether from a wealthy or a working-class family, was
advantaged by the rule. The marital presumption appears to provide her 'and
her children economic protections, but, in operation, those protections are
illusory. The husband could either bring in others to testify as to his
nonaccess or demand the child be removed from the household. On the one
hand, the law assisted him in avoiding paternity and on the other social and
economic power assisted him. Regardless of.the means, the wife and child
had little economic and physical security notwithstanding the presumption.
In the end, the rule served only to reinforce the social norm that she should
remain silent. At the same time, the evidentiary rule allowed others to
portray her as an adulteress. Thus, while simultaneously being denied her
procreative power, the claim of her sexual promiscuity was highlighted.
Part IV, which follows, uses the analysis of the common law marital
presumption and the evidentiary rule and their application by eighteenth-,
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century courts to explain the underpinnings
of current law represented by the UPA. It will demonstrate the continuing
vitality of the common law doctrines and how the racial and gendered
dimensions of the common law persist.
IV. THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT
An analysis that shows how the operation of the common law marital
presumption and the Lord Mansfield rule reinforced race boundaries in the
nineteenth century may seem to have little relevance to the current law of
legitimacy. The same might be said about an historical analysis that shows
how the common law doctrines enabled white men to avoid paternal
responsibilities for their children born to African-American women. An
analysis of eighteenth-, nineteenth- and early twentieth-century cases that
shows how in operation the common law marital presumption and the Lord
Mansfield rule reinforced white men's control over their wives and
contributed to the construction of white women as untrustworthy with
minimal procreative power may also seem to have little relevance to the
current law of legitimacy. However, such is not the case.
The abolition of slavery and the Supreme Court's decision in Loving
v. Virginia,75 which held anti-miscegenation statutes unconstitutional,
significantly changed the legal landscape with regard to the law of
legitimacy. In addition, the law of legitimacy has been significantly affected
7' 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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by the availability of reliable blood-typing tests for determining paternity.
Moreover, although the traditional family remains the norm by which our
society measures family deviancy, it is found less frequently to exist. The
increased frequency of nontraditional families seems to have led to
significant social, religious and legal tolerance for women and men who
engage in nonmarital sex. It also seems to have led the law to accord
children born out of wedlock substantial economic rights, including
inheritance rights.76
I would argue, however, that these changes in the law are not indicative
of an enlightened political or societal view of either African-American
families or of African-American or white women. On the contrary, the laws
have changed, but the construction of African-American families as deviant,
of African-American women as sexually available, and white women as
untrustworthy with minimal procreative power remains embedded in the law.
Current legislation relies heavily on the common law marital
presumption." Indicative of current legislation is the UPA, which the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated
in 1973 and which has been enacted in one-third of the states.78 The
76 See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (holding that statutes cannot
distinguish between illegitimate and legitimate children for purposes of intestate
succession); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (holding that a wrongful death act
must allow illegitimate and legitimate children to recover damages on the same basis).
" See, e.g., UPA § 4.
78 See UPA, 9B U.L.A. 287 (1973). The most relevant portions of the UPA are as
follows:
§ 4. [Presumption of Paternity]
(a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if:
(1) he and the child's natural mother are or have been
married to each other and the child is born during the
marriage, or within 300 days after the marriage is
terminated by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity,
or divorce, or after a decree of separation is entered by
a court ....
(b) A presumption under this section may be rebutted in an
appropriate action only by clear and convincing evidence ....
§ 6. [Determination of Father and Child Relationship; Who May Bring Action;
When Action May be Brought]
(a) A child, his natural mother, or a man presumed to be his father
under Paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of Section 4(a), may bring an action
(1) at any time for the purpose of declaring the existence
of the father and child relationship presumed under
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genesis of this influential act was a 1966 article published by Professor
Harry D. Krause entitled Bringing the Bastard into the Great Society: A
Proposed Uniform Act on Legitimacy.79 Krause became the reporter for
the UPA and provides us a good deal of legislative history about the UPA
in his book, Illegitimacy: Law and Social Policy.0
The UPA, like the common law presumption and the accompanying
evidentiary rule, was purportedly designed to serve the welfare of the child.
If the child is to have anything, it must have a right to have his
paternity ascertained in a fair and efficient manner. Specifically,
this means that legislation must recognize that the interest
primarily at stake in the paternity action is that of the child....
At the minimum, it will be necessary that the child, by his
representative, be a party to an action involving his paternity,
regardless of other parties (such as the mother) who may assert
their own interests in the same action. It is important that the
mother not be allowed to represent the child in this matter, as her
short-term interests (in avoiding publicity and emotional upset or
in accepting a settlement) may conflict with the long-term
interests of the child in having his paternity established for
support, inheritance and other purposes."'
Professor Krause's central concern about the child's welfare is accompanied
by a discussion underscoring the inherent conflict between a mother and her
child. The underlying assumption of this argument is that the mother cannot
be relied upon to consider the child's welfare. This negative view of the
mother recalls Lord Mansfield's opinion in which he found it necessary to
describe the mother as "the offending party" when discussing the welfare of
the child. 2 Although the hostility toward mothers does not seem to have
Paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of Section 4(a); or
(2) for the purpose of declaring the non-existence of the
father and child relationship presumed under Paragraph(1), (2), or (3) of Section 4(a) only if the action is
brought within a reasonable time after obtaining
knowledge of relevant facts, but in no event later than
[five] years after the child's birth. After the presumption
has been rebutted, paternity of the child by another man
may be determined in the same action, if he has been
made a party.
79 Harry D. Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the Great Society: A Proposed
Uniform Act on Legitimacy, 44 Tex. L. Rev. 829 (1966).
o Harry D. Krause, Illegitimacy: Law and Social Policy (1971).
s' Id. at 113.
82 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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disappeared in the last two hundred years, the question arises whether the
UPA, with its marital presumption, at least fulfills its promise of serving the
welfare of the child. That question is addressed in the next two sections.
A. The African-American Child
A disturbing aspect of the legislative history regarding the UPA's
marital presumption is that there is no evidence that the effect of the marital
presumption on African-American children was considered. As I concluded
in part II, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the marital presumption
and the evidentiary rule had little positive effect on the welfare of African-
American children either because the presumption was held inapplicable or
because the legal and social climate made the issue of legitimacy
inapposite. 3 In the 1970s when the UPA was promulgated and adopted
by many states, the legal and social climates had changed, but the law
regarding legitimacy (as opposed to illegitimacy) remained dedicated to a
concern about white fathers and their white children. When Professor
Krause considered African-American children he did so exclusively in the
context of illegitimacy. 4
The exclusive focus of the UPA on illegitimacy when considering the
welfare of African-American children raises two areas of inquiry. First,
what accounts for the exclusive focus on illegitimacy for African-American
children? Second, would the UPA's marital presumption and its related
procedural rules have been configured differently had the drafters considered
legitimacy issues with regard to African-American children?
As for the first question, Professor Krause is very clear about why the
central focus of his inquiry regarding African-American children was the
issue of illegitimacy. 5 In the 1960s, he had detected a clear trend of a
growing rate of illegitimacy among African-American children. 6 He
interpreted the demographic data as indicating that the denial of economic
rights, such as wrongful death and inheritance rights, to illegitimate children
operated in a racially discriminatory manner.8 7 A primary purpose of his
efforts, therefore, was to alleviate the legal consequences of illegitimacy as
one of the means to address the problem of poverty facing African-
American children.8
83 See supra Part H.B.
See Krause, supra note 80, at 257-95.
See id. at 257-67.
16 See id. at 258 n.2.
87 Id. at 259-60.
88 See id. at 267.
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The fact that illegitimacy was his chief concern, however, does not
explain why when drafting a statute that relied on the marital presumption
he would not consider its relevance for African-American children. The
explanation for that lies in part on the fact that, historically, legal and social
circumstances made the marital presumption inapposite to African-American
children.8 9
It also lies in part on his reliance on the work of E. Franklin Frazier
and on The Moynihan Report.90 In The Negro Family in the United
States,9 Professor Frazier concludes that female-headed families developed
during the slave period, gained prominence after emancipation, and
intensified through the crises of reconstruction and urbanization. The
Moynihan Report,9 2 named after Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, argued
that Frazier's analysis of black family history had continuing relevance in
contemporary society. These studies have been subject to severe criticism
as methodologically flawed and distorted in that the observations and
conclusions of the studies were a product of the Euro-American traditions
of monogamy, nuclearity and patriarchy.93
Although much of Professor Krause's own work predated the criticisms
of the Frazier study and the Moynihan Report, his reliance on them in
drafting the UPA should not be viewed as benign. The findings and
conclusions of these studies were widely influential and persuasive because
they reflected the pervasive stereotypes of African-American family
structures as deviant and of African-American women as women usurping
the patriarchy and as welfare mothers.94 These studies were also well
received because they relieved whites of some or all of their responsibilities
for the effects of slavery and discrimination. Their ultimate effect was to
transform African-American women into "scapegoats, responsible for the
psychological emasculation of black men and for the failure of the black
community to gain parity with the white community."95 Professor Krause
never questioned how the studies led to victim blaming.
'9 See supra Part f.B.
0 See Krause, supra note 80, at 260-65.
9' E. Franklin Frazier, The Negro Family in the United States (1966).
9' Office of Policy Planning and Research, U.S. Dep't of Labor, The Negro Family:
The Case for National Action (1965).
9' See, e.g., Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge,
Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment 75 (1990); Bonnie Thornton Dill, The
Dialectics of Black Womanhood, 4 Signs 543, 544-51 (1979); Herbert Gutman,
Persistent Myths About the Afro-American Family, 6 J. Interdisciplinary Hist. 181
(1975).
94 See Collins, supra note 93, at 75-76.
95 Dill, supra note 93, at 548.
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On the contrary, his emphasis on the welfare of the African-American
child in conjunction with his reliance on the negative, stereotypical images
of African-American women became the justification for determining the
child's father. To identify the father, however, required in many instances
that an African-American woman's sexual life become part of the public
domain for inspection and critique.96 Professor Krause created a conflict
of interest between the child and the mother and then resolved that conflict
against the mother. That resolution of the issues of poverty and illegitimacy
was inevitable once the mother was assigned blame and labelled unworthy.
The image of the welfare mother provides ideological
justifications for interlocking systems of race, gender, and class
oppression. African-Americans can be racially stereotyped as
being lazy by blaming Black welfare mothers for failing to pass
on the work ethic. Moreover, the welfare mother has no male
authority figure to assist her. Typically portrayed as an unwed
mother, she violates one cardinal tenet of Eurocentric masculinist
thought: she is a woman alone .... The image of the welfare
mother thus provides ideological justification for the dominant
group's interest in limiting the fertility of Black mothers who are
seen as producing too many economically unproductive
children.97
Legitimacy laws were irrelevant to the African-American child in the
eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries because laws and social
institutions were established to encourage illegitimacy. Part of an African-
American woman's productive value was her ability to reproduce workers
for use in the white-dominated economy; illegitimacy served that purpose
well. Illegitimate African-American children no longer serve the economy
and, in fact, are viewed as a burden upon it. Thus, it is not surprising that
while the attention of the laws and social institutions remains centered on
issues of illegitimacy, the purpose now is to discourage illegitimacy.
That does not mean, however, that legitimacy law - i.e., the marital
presumption - has no current relevance to African-American children. As
shown immediately below, the failure to recognize that relevance turns out
to be potentially costly to African-American children.
96 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 232.12 (1991) (each applicant for federal assistance
required to cooperate in establishing paternity); §§ 232.40-.49 (claiming and determining
good cause for noncooperation).
9' Collins, supra note 93, at 77. See also Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Code of Perfect
Pregnancy: At the Intersection of the Ideology of Motherhood, the Practice of Defaulting
to Science, and the Interventionist Mindset of Law, 53 Ohio St. L.J. 1205, 1304-06
(1992) (showing how the label of "Bad Mother" is reserved for women who are
assigned to outgroups based on their race, class, culture and sexual orientation).
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The UPA's marital presumption and the related procedural rules might
have been configured differently had legitimacy issues regarding African-
American children been considered. Two critical demographic statistics
indicate that the marital presumption as designed under the UPA may not
meet the needs of African-American children or their parents. In 1984,
fifty-nine percent of the births of African-American children were to
unmarried African-American women. 98 If, in 1984, forty-one percent of
the births of African-American children were to married African-American
women, then one must conclude that the marital presumption might well
have consequences for African-American families. The appropriateness of
the broad marital presumption rule found in the UPA might be questioned,
however, in light of one study which shows that African-American women
spend an average of eleven years separated between their first marriage and
divorce. 99 During this lengthy time of separation, any children born to the
wife will be treated as children of her husband. Situations may develop
where the presumption of paternity of the absent husband becomes
problematic. In those situations, the statute of limitations, which precludes
the wife, husband and child from declaring the non-existence of paternity
more than five years after the child's birth, may prove particularly
troublesome."° It does not seem a sufficient response to say that the UPA
is furthering the welfare of the child by presuming the wife's husband to be
the father. At stake is not only whether the child's biological father will be
held financially responsible, but also whether a man who has neither social
nor biological connection to a child will be deemed by law to be the father.
A legal presumption that has no basis in reality is seldom helpful.''
A mother is unlikely to want any connection with a man who no longer
plays a role in her life and has no social or biological connection with her
child. Yet, the law deems that man the father of her child and imposes
parental obligations on him giving him a legal basis for intruding himself
into the lives of the mother and the child in a potentially disruptive and
problematic manner. In this situation, the legal rule is not furthering
domestic tranquility, but contributing to family strife. Moreover, it is not
9" See Reynolds Farley & Suzanne M. Bianchi, The Growing Racial Difference in
Marriage and Family Patterns, in Robert Staples, The Black Family: Essays and Studies
6 (Table 1) (4th ed. 1991). Thirteen percent of the births of white children in 1984 were
to unmarried- women. Id.
99 Id. at 8. This compares to two years for white women. Id. Without more
information regarding relative income levels of African-American and white women, it
is difficult to know whether the different family patterns are attributable to race or class,
or to both.
'00 UPA § 6(a)(2).
... See infra note 122 for a discussion of Clay v. Clay, 397 N.W.2d 571 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986).
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enough to say that the child is benefited by the ability to charge some man
with support obligations and the right to claim a share of his estate at death.
By having someone else presumed to be the father, the biological father may
feel less obligation to participate in the rearing and financial support of his
child. In effect, the legal rule may have the effect of encouraging the
biological father to abandon his child and ignore his child-rearing
obligations.
When considering the issues of illegitimacy regarding African-
American children, Professor Krause strongly argued against relying
exclusively on the formality of marriage for creating a legal relationship
between father and child.
If the law denies one in four black children a legal relationship
with his father, the law must be adapted to the social
circumstance that the parents of one in four black children have
neglected to comply with a formality. There are sound methods
other than marriage certificates to determine descent - which is
a question of fact, not morality. And one longstep toward
encouraging private responsibility is to impose it. "
Professor Krause understood that the absence of a marriage certificate
should not deny an African-American child the benefit of a father. Had he
been aware of the data regarding marriage and divorce for African-American
women, Professor Krause might have more clearly understood that the
existence of a marriage certificate and the absence of a divorce decree
should not, without more, be sufficient to determine fatherhood.
As shown in parts II and III, the marital presumption is a part of a
patriarchal family tradition that gains its power through economic, social and
legal institutions. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the
benefits of these institutions were not available to African-American men,
and without such institutions the marital presumption has had little positive
effect on the lives of the men or their children. This section demonstrates,
through recent demographic data, that current African-American family
patterns reflect, but do not replicate, the traditional white family. Economic
and social stresses produce different family patterns as African-American
women live the contradiction of their "historical role[s] as ... laborer[s] in
a society where ideals of femininity emphasize[] domesticity."'' 3
Unsurprisingly, attention to African-American family patterns leads to the
conclusion that the marital presumption, as presently designed in the UPA,
inadequately meets the needs of African-American women and their
children.
'0' Krause, supra note 80, at 265.
103 Dill, supra note 93, at 553.
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This section raises serious questions about whether the marital
presumption found in the UPA was intended to, and in fact does, serve the
welfare of African-American children. The question explored in the next
section is whether the claim regarding the welfare of the child has any
validity for a child born to white parents.
B. The White Child
Although the UPA's marital presumption was not designed with
African-American children in mind, much of what I am saying in the
following discussion applies to African-American families. In investigating
the purposes and possible explanations for the UPA rules, however, I center
this part of the discussion on white families. I do this because white
children were the focus of this legislation and because the comparison of the
UPA and the common law presumption and evidentiary rule requires a
distinction to be made between white and African-American families.
The UPA presumes a husband is the father of his wife's child and
continues the common law tradition of precluding dual paternity."° By
privileging the marital relationship, the UPA would seem to continue the
common law tradition of leaving the legal husband with the right to decide
to make the white child his own." 5
Arguably, the growing efforts regarding enforcement of child support
orders against fathers would seem to limit severely the choice white men
have historically enjoyed regarding fatherhood. The explanation for the
widespread acceptance of the presumption within this new legal environment
may be attributable to the technological advances in the reliability of blood-
" UPA § 4. The standing rules of the UPA preclude another man from asserting
paternity claims if the marital presumption and not the cohabitation presumption is
operative. Id. § 6. There has been a good deal of litigation regarding the rights to
fatherhood of a man who, through blood-typing tests, is proven to be the biological
father. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Presse v. Koenemann,
554 So. 2d 406 (Ala. 1989); In re Melissa G., 261 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1989); John M. v.
Paula T., 571 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1990); Mary Kay Kisthardt, Of Fatherhood, Families and
Fantasy: The Legacy of Michael H. v. Gerald D., 65 Tul. L. Rev. 585 (1991); Traci
Dallas, Note, Rebutting the Marital Presumption: A Developed Relationship Test, 88
Colum. L. Rev. 369 (1988). See supra note 43 and accompanying text for earlier
discussion of dual paternity.
10s
The application of the presumption of legitimacy of a child born to a married
woman would be in the child's interest in practically all cases. If the mother's
husband does not disavow paternity, there is no reason to go after the child's
true father.
Krause, supra note 80, at 77.
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typing tests to determine patemity. 6 The husband now has the ability to
determine with certainty whether a child born to his wife is his. If the
blood-typing tests show that the child is not his, under the statute he can
avoid fatherhood so long as he disputes paternity within five years of the
child's birth.'0 7 Thus the availability of blood-typing tests makes the
burden of child support of little consequence to a husband who decides he
does not want to be the child's father and who knows the child is not his.
The fact that a wife can contest her husband's paternity under the UPA
and testify to his nonaccess could be viewed as an improvement over the
common law.0" By not silencing the wife, the UPA, contrary to the
common law, acknowledges her power to know her child with certainty and
also know who the child's father is and who he is not."
On the other hand, the reliability of blood tests would seem to
undermine the importance of allowing the wife to testify regarding her
sexuality and her reproductivity." 0 The UPA should not be understood
106
It is expected that blood test evidence will go far toward stimulating voluntary
settlements of actions to determine paternity. In this connection, proposed
legislation currently pending in the U.S. Senate should be considered. Senate
Bill 2081, 93d Congress, 1st Sess. (June 27, 1973), looks toward the
establishment of a national system of federally assisted child support
enforcement and provides for an efficient system of blood typing.
UPA § 12, cmt. See also Krause, supra note 80, at 123-37 (describing the reliability
of blood tests for exclusion and inclusion purposes).
Since promulgation of the UPA, determination of paternity based on blood testing
has improved, providing greater accuracy both for exclusion and inclusion of paternity.
See Linda Shoemaker, Comment, Bastardizing the Legitimate Child: The Colorado
Supreme Court Invalidates the Uniform Parentage Act Presumption of Legitimacy in
R.McG. v. J.W., 59 Denv. L.J. 157, 171 (1981); Vera L. Sterlek & Lee M. Jacobson,
Comment, Paternity Testing with the Human Leukocyte Antigen System: A
Medicolegal Breakthrough, 20 Santa Clara L. Rev. 511 (1980); Joint AMA-ABA
Guidelines: Present Status of Serologic Testing in Problems of Disputed Parentage, 10
Fam. L.Q. 247 (1976); see also Herbert F. Polesky, Application of Genetic Marker
Typing: Disputed Parentage Cases 12 (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Columbia Journal of Gender and Law) (predicting that advances in technology may
make it feasible in the future to directly examine differences in human chromosomes for
the purpose of exclusion and inclusion of paternity).
'07 UPA § 6(a).
10' Under the UPA, only the biological mother, child or the presumed father may
rebut the presumption. See UPA § 6(a).
'09 See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
.0. See Clay v. Clay, 397 N.W.2d 571 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). In this case, the
court held the husband to be the father of the child by dismissing the wife's testimony
as proof that a man other than her current husband was the father and treats the blood-
typing tests as critical:
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to support the proposition that a wife's word is believed more today than it
was in the past or that her unique knowledge is recognized. The UPA's
willingness to allow the wife to testify is just as easily explained as a
harmless concession within the new technological climate. There is no risk
in letting a wife speak now that scientific evidence is available to
corroborate or impeach her testimony.
The importance of allowing the wife to testify is further undermined by
the heightened burden of proof of clear and convincing evidence. If, at the
time of a paternity proceeding, neither the husband nor the putative father
are available for blood-typing tests, it is not at all clear under the statute
whether the wife's testimony alone would be sufficient to meet the clear and
convincing standard."' In that respect, the UPA is not so different from
the common law - better to attribute fatherhood erroneously to the husband
than to have to rely on the wife's word.
One further aspect of the UPA undermines the importance of allowing
the wife to testify. The wife (as well as the husband and the child) can only
bring a suit to declare the non-existence of paternity within five years of the
child's birth. 12 The time limitation has not been the subject of much
discussion. "
[The alleged father] has, in fact denied paternity in his Answer. He has not
participated in any blood test to determine the probability that he is [the
child's] father. [The wife] testified that [the alleged father] is the child's
father, and [the husband] understandably wishes that the court would treat
that claim as an established fact.
Id. at 579-80. See also Lonning v. Leonard, 767 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (the
wife testified that she had sexual intercourse with the putative father and denied having
sexual intercourse with her husband; the husband testified they did have sexual
intercourse; the accuracy of results of blood-typing tests, which indicated that the
husband was not the father, was contested on cross-examination; the putative father
denied paternity at trial; and the court affirmed the trial court's verdict finding paternity
of the husband).
.' Cf. Finkenbinder v. Burton, 477 So. 2d 459 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985) (blood-typing
tests placed the probability of the putative father's paternity at 97.1%; the court
emphasized that expert testimony showed a possibility that the putative father was not
the biological father and that the husband and wife (now divorced) both testified that
they had sexual relations during the estimated time of conception; the court held that
evidence was directed at proving the putative father was the biological father, but failed
to disprove the legal presumption that the husband was the biological father); see also
Blake v. Div. of Child.Support Enforcement, 525 A.2d 154 (Del. 1987) (wife's and
putative father's testimony conflicted, but the presumption that the husband was the
father of the child was rebutted and the putative father was found to be the natural father
based on blood-typing tests).
2 UPA § 6(a)(2).
113 The focus of attention has been the exclusion of the putative father from having
standing to rebut the presumption of legitimacy. See supra note 104.
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Presumably, one of its purposes is to assure prompt determinations of
paternity. The benefit of this is that it avoids problems of proof created by
the passing of time. With paternity based for the most part on blood tests,
however, potential problems of proof do not seem sufficiently significant.
In any case, the higher burden of proof to rebut the presumption would
seem to provide sufficient protection to the state and the interested parties.
Second, the time limit provides certainty and finality to the issue of
paternity." 4 In this context certainty and finality mean that the legal white
family is given protection against interference." 5 If the focus of the legal
family is the marital unit, this rationale fails because it is based on the
insupportable assumption that just because the marriage is intact at the time
of conception and the birth of the child, it will remain intact. ' 6
14 See Pierce v. Pierce, 374 N.W.2d 450 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (husband in
divorce action alleged his paternity to his wife's child who was born when the wife was
married to another man; the court held that the UPA denied the putative father standing
to challenge paternity and, in any case, that he was barred by the UPA's statute of
limitations; in explaining the statute of limitations, the court said that the "obvious
intent" of the statute of limitations "is to make the presumption of legitimacy
conclusive").
"5 The statute also embraces couples who have attempted to marry. See UPA §
4(a)(2)-(3).
Professor Olsen urges us to be skeptical of arguments based on noninterference in
family matters.
The notion of noninterference in the family depends upon some shared
conception of proper family roles, and "neutrality" can be understood only with
reference to such roles. For example, one of the bases upon which statutes
limiting access to contraceptives have been struck down is that such statutes
intrude upon the marital relation. Governmental programs providing minors
with access to contraceptives, however, are also condemned as state interference
in the family. Thus, "interference" is not a simple description of state action or
inaction, but rather a way of condemning particular state policies, usually those
aimed at changing the status quo. The status quo itself is treated as something
natural and not as the responsibility of the state. Actual inequality and
domination in the family - as in the free market - are represented as private
matters that the state did not bring about, although it could undertake to change
them.
Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform,
96 Harv. L. Rev. 1497, 1506 (1983).
116 Cf. Krause, supra note 80, at 77-78:
Society has come to accept impermanent sexual liaisons as proper, if only they
are rubber-stamped by Nevada's divorce or marriage clerks in proper sequence.
By considering them legitimate, society has given full legal rights to the
offspring of such impermanent unions. Why should the argument of "family
protection" be more applicable to the offspring of parents who have never been
married than to the "sequential polygamists" who are tolerated if not encouraged
by our law?
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Moreover, it fails to take into account the circumstances in which a wife is
likely to find herself if she remains married to her husband. It is unlikely
to be in the wife's interest or her child's interest to contest her husband's
paternity. Circumstances change, however, and she may find herself
silenced by the statute of limitations, against her or her child's interest, in
much the same way she was silenced by Lord Mansfield's evidentiary
rule.' 17
The finality rationale does have force, however, if we understand that
the primary concern of the UPA is the relationship between the white
husband and the white child." 8 The five-year rule provides the husband
with considerable security regarding his fatherhood." 9 To be sure, that
This quote is from an extended discussion in which Professor Krause argues that "family
protection" is not a sound basis for denying rights to illegitimate children. He was
emphasizing the impermanence of legal marriages to show that an illegitimate child is
not likely to threaten existing marriages significantly. He does not consider why this
-same argument should not apply to extend or eliminate the time limitation.
"7 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Ingram, 531 N.E.2d 97 (Ill. App. 1988) (barring
wife, due to state's statute of limitations (different from the UPA), from raising a
paternity issue in litigation involving the dissolution of marriage and custody of minor
child); B.P. v. G.P., 536 A.2d 271 (N.J. Super. 1987) (holding that a divorced wife's
failure to file her complaint for paternity at the time of divorce precludes her from filing
one after the judgment of divorce, although wife alleged a man other than her divorced
husband to be the father). But cf. Simcox ex rel. Dear v. Simcox, 529 N.E.2d 1032 (I!.
App. 1988) (permitting child to pursue a petition to declare paternity even though
paternity had been determined in previous divorce action).
118 See text at supra note 62.
"' The UPA does not provide the husband complete security of the father-child
relationship. § 6(a)(1) provides that under certain of the presumptions enumerated in
§ 4, a man presumed to be the child's father can bring an action "at any time for the
purpose of declaring the existence of the father and child relationship .... ." One
presumption allows a man to bring an action to determine paternity when "after the
child's birth, he and the child's natural mother have married, . . . and (i) he has
acknowledged his paternity of the child in writing . . . ; (ii) with his consent, he is
named as the child's father on the child's birth certificate, or (iii) he is obligated to
support the child under a written voluntary promise or by court order." § 4(a)(3). Thus,
if the husband and wife divorce and the wife marries the putative father and the putative
father acknowledges his paternity and voluntarily promises to support the child, the
putative father, at any time, has the right to have his paternity declared. See Markert
v. Behm, 394 N.W.2d 239 (Minn. App. 1986) (the court instructed the putative father
as to how he could obtain standing under the UPA); see also Finkenbinder v. Burton,
477 So. 2d 459 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985) (the putative father who married the divorced
wife of the presumed husband was allowed to intervene in a petition to modify the
decree as to custody, visitation rights and support; the court denied the petition to
modify); D.S.P. v. R.L.K., 677 P.2d 959 (Colo. App. 1983) (the putative father who
received the child into his home and held the child out as his own was treated as an
"interested party" and was not subject to the five-year rule even though the marital
presumption applied); Simcox, 529 N.E.2d 1032. But see Ex Parte Presse, 554 So. 2d
406 (Ala. 1989) (the court denied the putative father standing to initiate an action to
establish a father-child relationship, notwithstanding that he had married the mother and
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security comes with the concomitant cost of not being able, in the future, to
avoid fatherhood responsibilities, even though his circumstances change and
fatherhood proves inconvenient. 2 °
The statute of limitations pertaining to the marital presumption carries
with it vestiges of the common law presumption and the Lord Mansfield
rule. If the white husband chooses fatherhood,'2 ' the law will use its
power to enforce his choice against his wife, his child and the biological
father.' Legal marriage, legal presumptions and legal procedures work
that the child lived in his home while a minor).
20 See, e.g., Clay v. Clay, 397 N.W.2d 571 (Minn. App. 1986) (divorced husband,
who stipulated to paternity in dissolution proceeding, could not raise issue of paternity
in postdecree motion because the UPA's statute of limitations had run); Watts v. Watts,
337 A.2d 350 (N.H. 1975) (husband attempted to escape a child support order in
connection with a divorce proceeding by denying his paternity and moving for an order
of blood tests; the court denied his motion saying that "[t]o allow defendant to escape
liability for support by using blood tests would be to ignore his lengthy [for over fifteen
years], voluntary acceptance of parental responsibilities"); see also In re Marriage of
Holland, 730 P.2d 410 (Mont. 1986) (divorced husband was in arrears on child support
payments; the court upheld dismissal of a motion by divorced husband requesting a
paternity determination on grounds that the issue had been litigated in dissolution
action).
..1 Professor Krause consistently emphasizes the husband's choice in his discussion
of the marital presumption. See Krause, supra note 80, at 77 ("If the mother's husband
does not disavow paternity, there is no reason to go after the child's true father.... If,
on the other hand, the mother's husband has disavowed paternity, no obstacle lies in the
way of pursuing the child's father."); id. at 97 ("In the best interests of the child born
illegitimately to a married mother, pursuing its true paternity would not be indicated,
unless the mother's husband has disavowed paternity. For the same reason (protection
of the family) that continues to support the presumption of legitimacy of children born
to a married mother, an illegitimate father's claim to his child born 'legitimately' to a
married mother should not be heard - unless the mother's husband has disavowed
paternity or consented to the legitimation of the child by its actual father." Id. (footnotes
omitted)).
122 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1991) (Scalia, J.) ("If [the
biological father] has a 'freedom not to conform' (whatever that means), [the husband]
must equivalently have a 'freedom to conform.' One of them will pay a price for
asserting that 'freedom' - [the biological father] by being unable to act as father of the
child he has adulterously begotten, or [the husband] by being unable to preserve the
integrity of the traditional family unit he and [his wife's daughter] have established.");
see also Colb, supra note 66, at 108-12 (discussing the certainty aspect of Michael H).
But see Clay v. Clay, 397 N.W.2d 571 (Minn. App. 1986), in which the husband
submitted to blood-typing tests that proved he was not the father of his wife's child; the
court held that an action to establish his nonpaternity of the child was barred by the
UPA's statute of limitations. In a dissent Judge Randall identifies the mire created by
the marital presumption:
What we have in this case is the legal system handing five-year old T.C.
a piece of paper which states that appellant is his father. T.C.'s mother knows
that is not true. All the court personnel associated with the case know that is
not true .... All friends and relatives who have knowledge of the facts know
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with the husband to produce a child for him. In other words, the power of
the law becomes the equivalent of white male procreative power.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article undertook an examination of how the marital presumption
and the related evidentiary rule operated in the United States during the
eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This study revealed
that the presumption's and rule's traditional justification, that of promoting
the welfare of the child, is the means by which the law masked white male
control of procreation. This control was exercised in different ways over,
and with different consequences. for, African-American women, African-
American men and white women. Examination of the widely adopted UPA
further showed that the welfare-of-the-child justification continues to mask
white male control of procreation.
The central focus of the marital presumption under the UPA is the
determination of fatherhood for white males. Although the UPA appears to
overrule the Lord Mansfield Rule and to allow the wife to testify regarding
the father of her child, her unique knowledge regarding procreation still is
not recognized. Blood-typing technologies, a heightened burden of proof
and the statute of limitations all operate to undermine the importance of her
testimony and, therefore, her procreative power. The UPA, like the common
law marital presumption and the Lord Mansfield Rule, continues the legal
tradition of wrenching procreative power away from women and usurping
it on behalf of white males.
The crucial result of this analysis is the exposure of the means by
which the law enforces and reinforces racial and gender hierarchies. A
similar analytical approach to other inheritance law doctrines is likely to
identify other legal techniques that perpetuate racial and gender hierarchies.
If systematically applied to this area of the law, such analysis may
destabilize widely accepted principles. More importantly, it may also lay
the foundation for transforming the inheritance law from a system that
reflects existing dominant values into a system designed to promote and
serve the interests of members of traditionally subordinated groups.
that is not true. The judiciary handing T.C. that piece of paper knows that is
not true, and, in a few short years when T.C. can comprehend things, he will
know that the court system gave him a piece of paper which is not true.
Id. at 581.
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